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Essays to Honor a Mentor
These fine essays are an extension and reflection of the meticulous,
wide-ranging and revelatory scholarship of Robert W. Johannsen, and they bear
the earmark of his mentorship. Each is based on solid archival research, and all
are characterized by straight forward political narrative, balanced analysis, and
judicious arguments that are thoughtful and suggestive. The organization of the
collection coheres in such a way that the individual essays both complement one
another thematically and extend over time the authors’ analyses of changes and
continuities in political culture of the Civil War era. The first half of the
collection focuses on the transformation of national politics in the antebellum
era, and the second half examines the interplay of culture, politics, and war.
Robert D. Sampson and Michael F. Conlin illuminate facets of the protean
concept of Manifest Destiny. Sampson demonstrates that the romantic and often
bumptious nationalism that characterized John L. O’Sullivan’s writings in the
1840s was eclipsed by sectionalism following the passage of the
Kansas-Nebraska Act. Once anxious to expand the freedoms of white males over
space and through time, O’Sullivan became increasingly frustrated by the
ascendancy of the slavery extension issue in the national discourse of politics.
O’Sullivan’s argument for popular sovereignty and its concomitant—sectional
accommodation—became increasing couched in racist terms. Jacksonian ideals
about the perfectibility of man did not apply to slaves who did not share and
would never share in a destiny that was becoming less manifest.
Michael Conlin convincingly argues that the territorial expansion that issued
from it infused the Smithsonian Institution with a “volatile mix of nationalism,
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science, and politics" (75). Put in reductive terms, territorial expansion led to an
expansion of knowledge in the areas of natural history, astronomy, and the
manufacture of scientific instruments. At the same time that expansion revealed
the limitations and internal contradictions of Manifest Destiny, it had the
adventitious effect of elevating American science to the level of that of Europe.
Whereas the territorial question sectionalized politics and blunted the
boundlessness of O’Sullivan’s “Great Nation of Futurity," the Smithsonian
Institution under the leadership of Joseph Henry embraced the nationalism
reforming spirit, and expansionist ethos of Manifest Destiny into the 1850s.
James Huston, Willard Carl Klunder, Matthew Norman, and Colin McCoy
examine the transformation of political culture in the 1850s and the many ways
in which the territorial issue contributed to the fragmentation and
sectionalization of the Jacksonian party system. Huston convincingly argues that
the ironic and unintended effect of the debates over the Kansas-Nebraska Act
was to make race more, not less, salient in the political discourse of the 1850s.
Stephen Douglas and others framed their defense of popular sovereignty—and
by extension Democratic politics—in racist terms that perforce excluded Blacks.
Republicans logically concluded that by definition Douglas’s defense of popular
sovereignty raised the question of whether free Blacks had natural rights and
political rights. “The definition of ‘people,’" Huston observes, “was the Achilles
heel of Douglas’s doctrine" (109). As a consequence, race, which had been
largely absent from national politics in the 1840s, became central to political
debate in the 1850s.
Where Huston’s essay adds a moral dimension to what is often taken for
granted as a political and constitutional question, Will Klunder analyzes the
manner in which variant concepts of popular sovereignty fragmented the
Democratic Party in the late 1850s. In the 1840s through the Compromise of
1850, Lewis Cass and Douglas embraced popular sovereignty as a principled and
pragmatic solution to the territorial issue. On the one hand, it was consistent with
the Democratic belief in local self-governance; on the other, it was sufficiently
ambiguous to appeal to northerners and southerners alike. Both supported the
Nebraska bill believing it harmonious with both the principles of the party and
the underlying premise of the Compromise of 1850. But neither Jacksonian
Democrat realized that by 1854 the territorial issue had transformed the political
landscape. Events in Kansas would prove that popular sovereignty was less the
basis for middle or common ground between the sections than it was a battle
ground. While Douglas broke with the Buchanan administration over the
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Lecompton constitution arguing it was a travesty of popular sovereignty, Cass
supported the president choosing pragmatism of compromise and primacy of
party over principle. The Democracy was divided.
Matthew Norman returns to the theme raised in Jim Huston’s essay:
principled divisions between Democrats and Republicans and more specifically
between Douglas and Lincoln. In a parallel to the growing rift between Douglas
and Cass over the meaning of popular sovereignty, Norman examines the
principled differences between Douglas and Lincoln over the right of revolution.
Both supported revolution against tyrannical governments in the abstract, and
each endorsed the European revolutions of 1848. Douglas and Lincoln agreed
that the United States was a model republic; each revered the work of the
founders, especially the Declaration of Independence; and both were more
supportive of the struggles of European revolutionaries than with the enslaved at
home. But by the late 1850s, the territorial issue had sectionalized that inherited
revolutionary political heritage. Although Douglas and Lincoln both sought to
perpetuate the Union, their debates in 1858 proved that each believed the other’s
policies (popular sovereignty and restriction) posed a fundamental threat to its
perpetuity. Both opposed secession, however, drawing a distinction between the
natural right to revolution and the legal and constitutional abomination of
secession.
Colin McCoy extends Norman’s analysis by exploring the uncomfortable
and tenuous relationship of Jacksonian men to and within the party of Lincoln.
Former Whigs and abolitionists who made up one wing of the Republican party
attacked slavery and the Confederacy’s defense of it on moral grounds.
Antislavery Jacksonians dilated on the deleterious effects of the institution on
whites. Originally free soil Democrats’ allegiance to the party was largely
personal. Wish parenting thought, they envisioned Lincoln as Jackson reborn,
drawing parallels between the secession crisis and the nullification controversy.
Yet they were always suspicious of the president’s resolve and the Republican
Party’s position on slavery and race. Once the common enemy had been put
down in 1865, these former Democrats refused to support radical Republicans’
Reconstruction policies. Remaining true to their conservative prewar principles,
they returned the Democratic Party fold in the 1870s. The Civil War proved to
be less a watershed in political alignment than a temporary truce between
partisan antagonists.
3
Morrison: Politics and Culture of the Civil War Era:  Essays in Honor of Ro
Published by LSU Digital Commons, 2009
The essays of Bryon Andresen, David Raney, and Kenneth Noe shift the
focus of the collection to the relationship among culture, politics, and war.
Andreasen parses the Copperhead Christian critique of Lincoln’s wartime
policies. Standing apart from Christian abolitionist critics, northern evangelical
Democrats asserted that Lincoln and Republicans subverted traditional scriptural
authority through appeals to a “higher law." As embattled dissenters within their
own churches, these Copperhead Christians legitimized their critique by
attacking the moral pretentions of super-patriotic ministers and laymen while
pointing out the hypocritical behavior of drunken, licentious, and craven
Republicans and Union military leaders. Stressing the Christian imperatives of
peace and magnanimity, they fashioned an opposition to the war and to a
growing alliance between church and state.
David Raney provides a thematic counterpoint to the Copperheads’ religious
dissent in his examination of the United States Christian Commission’s support
of the Union war effort. Other civilian philanthropic organizations opposed its
endeavors and Union commanders only grudgingly tolerated its effort to provide
sustenance to their troops. Yet soldiers and their kin overwhelming supported the
many and varied activities of the Christian Commission to attend to the physical
and spiritual needs of Union combatants.
Kenneth Noe returns to the larger theme of the separation of church and
state during war in his essay on the Confederate divine, Isaac Tichenor—“The
Fighting Chaplain of Shiloh." Tichenor, who would champion New South
industrialization and become the president of what would become Auburn
University, was a chaplain in the 17th Alabama. He took an active part in the
battle of Shiloh, first rallying his unit against a withering attack by the 50th
Illinois then as an active combatant in the Confederate counterattack against
Union forces in the Hornet’s Nest. Although he celebrated himself and was
himself celebrated by the press for his martial exploits, Tichenor soon found
himself the subject of a withering fusillade from southern critics who
disapproved of behavior “both reckless and contrary to the chaplain’s calling"
(255). Although Noe claims Tichenor remained a sharpshooter at heart and in his
heart, he spent the rest of his public career attempting to reclaim the moral high
ground of chaplain.
The final two essays consider Lincoln as wartime commander. Daniel
McDonough argues persuasively that the president’s choice of Ambrose
Burnside to succeed George McClellan was as logical as it was tragic. Lincoln
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believed that the new commander of the Army of the Potomac had to come from
within, have a proven record of success in the field, and be acceptable to the
McClellan wing. Burnside proved acceptable on all accounts. McDonough
argues that the fiasco at Fredericksburg resulted from a series of errors in
judgment up and down the chain of command from Henry Halleck to Fighting
Joe Hooker and other field officers who undermined Burnside’s authority within
the army. Yet he makes clear that although the campaign was not predestined to
fail, Burnside’s fecklessness (which Lincoln had mistaken for modesty) and,
ironically, his inflexibility proved fatal at Fredericksburg.
Appropriately enough, this festschrift ends with Bruce Tap’s essay on
presidential politics in the 1864 campaign. Tap examines the somewhat
precarious position of Lincoln in that canvass as dissent within the Republican
ranks threatened to undermine his reelection prospects. Radicals unhappy with
the president’s policy for reconstructing the Union and his opposition to the
Wade-Davis bill scouted the idea of alternate Republican candidates, including
John C. Frémont who was already in the field. Tap painstakingly parses the
tangled and largely obscured negotiations that led to Frémont’s withdrawal,
placing Senator Zachariah Chandler of Michigan at the center of the mystery.
Tap persuasively argues that there was no agreement struck between the
president and the Pathfinder. Yet the evidence strongly suggests that Chandler
negotiated both Frémont’s exit from the canvass and the removal of Postmaster
Montgomery Blair as the quid pro quo for a united Republican party.
John Hoffmann’s first essay in this collection is a fond recollection of
Robert Johannsen’s career as fledgling graduate student, senior scholar, and a
teacher. The portrait that emerges is of an indefatigable researcher, a judicious
scholar, a conscientious classroom instructor, a warm, humane mentor, and an
absolutely delightful human being. His students who have contributed to this
collection have done very well by Professor Johannsen. His many talents and
outstanding qualities are everywhere evident in essays that enrich our
understanding of the politics and culture of the Civil War era. This is that rare
collection of essays whose whole is more than the sum of its parts.
Michael A. Morrison is associate professor of History at Purdue University
and the author of Slavery and the American West: The Eclipse of Manifest
Destiny and the Coming of the Civil War. He is currently working on a study of
the Mexican-American War.
5
Morrison: Politics and Culture of the Civil War Era:  Essays in Honor of Ro
Published by LSU Digital Commons, 2009
